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This thesis analyzes how U.S. Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID) proved itself 
to be a critical component in the successful campaign against the Hukbalahap (i.e., Huks) 
in the Philippines and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El 
Salvador. In addition, this thesis explores how AvFID was employed in Vietnam and why 
AvFID was not successful there. The overall argument is that airpower was not a decisive 
factor in the two successful counterinsurgency campaigns examined. However, airpower 
certainly played a critical role in quelling both insurgencies and without U.S. AvFID the 
air forces in the Philippines and El Salvador would not have been able to employ 
airpower as effectively as they did. In contrast, Vietnam offers a case study where AvFID 
failed; this thesis explores why. Ultimately, the reader should walk away with ideas about 
how to implement AvFID more effectively, and that if done right, can help ensure that 
AvFID can make a significant difference in a counterinsurgency campaign. 
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In January 2012, President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta 
released the United States’ (U.S.) new defense priorities for the 21st century. A key 
principle of the new strategy document is that “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to 
conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”1  It also states that, “Whenever 
possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve 
our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory 
capabilities.”2  It is clear that the U.S. wants to avoid massive military footprints on 
foreign soil that result in becoming bogged down in conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq. It 
is also apparent that the Department of Defense (DoD) plans to address these new 
priorities through Special Operations Forces (SOF) working by, with, and through allies 
and partner nation-states.3 
One way for SOF to work by, with, and through allies and partner nation-states is 
to assess, train, advise, and assist the partner nation’s military forces to protect 
themselves from internal threats. This is essentially the mission of Foreign Internal 
Defense (FID). The effectiveness of FID, and for the purposes of this thesis, Aviation 
FID (AvFID), remains controversial especially when one considers the U.S.’s 
experiences in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. However, there are historical instances 
when AvFID did make a difference. Thus, in light of DoD’s new defense strategy and the 
U.S.’s experiences in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq, it is essential to review how the 
U.S. successfully worked by, with, and through states to combat irregular threats in the 
past. 
This thesis analyzes how U.S. AvFID proved itself to be a critical component in 
the Philippine’s and El Salvador’s overall successful campaigns against the Hukbalahap 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:  Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 
January 2012, 6. Emphasis in original. 
2 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership, 3. Emphasis in original. . 
3 David Barno and Travis Sharp, “SOF Power,” February 14, 2012, 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/sof_power?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full 
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and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgencies, respectively. 
In addition, this thesis explores how AvFID was employed in Vietnam and why AvFID 
was not successful. It will first examine what FID and AvFID are, while exploring 
AvFID’s origins and its relationship to special operations.  
In each of the case studies presented, the focus will be on the country’s history, 
particularly its political, economic, and social aspects. The intent is to better understand 
what led to the insurgency and ensuing civil war. Next, I will analyze the U.S. 
involvement, the strategic plan (if one existed), the role and relationship of U.S. military 
advisors to the host nation’s military, and what role AvFID played in the overall strategic 
plan to combat the insurgency. 
My overall argument is that airpower, while not a decisive factor in the two 
successful campaigns I analyzed (i.e., against the Huks or FMLN), nevertheless played a 
critical part in quelling both insurgencies. Without U.S. AvFID, the Philippines’ and El 
Salvador’s air forces would not have been able to employ airpower as effectively as they 
did. In contrast, the Vietnam case study points to an instance when AvFID failed. 
Ultimately, the reader should be able to walk away with issues worth contemplating 
before attempting to implement AvFID, as well as the idea that AvFID can make a 
significant difference in a counterinsurgency campaign.   
FID falls under the purview of irregular warfare and is considered one of five 
principal activities or operations that are performed to confront irregular threats. Joint 
Publication 3–07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal 
Defense, defines FID as “the participation by civilian and military agencies of a 
government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other 
designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and 
insurgency.”4  The responsibility for the FID mission resides with U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM). As such, the responsibility of the air component of 
FID, AvFID, belongs to Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). 
                                                 
4 Department of Defense, “Joint Publication 3–07.1 – Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Internal Defense,” April 30, 2004, ix.    
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Air Force special operations traces its roots to World War II (WWII) with the 
formation of the 1st Air Commando Group.5  Commanded by Lieutenants Colonel Philip 
G. Cochran and John R. Alison, the 1st Air Commando Group was ordered by General 
Henry H. “Hap” Arnold to directly support General Orde C. Wingate’s guerrilla forces, 
the Chindits.6  Considered an unconventional warfare unit, the 1st Air Commando Group 
primarily supported the Chindits, who operated deep behind Japanese lines in Burma, 
with air resupply and medical evacuation, using gliders and other nonstandard aviation 
platforms. At the end of WWII, the 1st Air Commando Group was deactivated and 
absorbed into conventional units.   
Similarly, during the Korean War, three wings were activated to support 
unconventional warfare missions only for all three to be fully deactivated by 1957.7  In 
fact, it was not until President John F. Kennedy’s administration that special operations 
received a dedicated sponsor. President Kennedy did not think that the current military 
organization was capable of adequately responding to insurgencies or wars of national 
liberation that dominated the world scene at the time. Consequently, President Kennedy 
directed his Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, to have the military establish 
units dedicated to counterinsurgency (COIN). In response to pressure from the Kennedy 
administration, the Air Force activated the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron 
(CCTS) in 1961. The mission of the 4400th CCTS, nicknamed “Jungle Jim,” “was to 
train foreign air force personnel in the application of airpower in COIN.”8  The first 
detachment of the 4400th CCTS, code-named “Farm Gate,” deployed to Vietnam in 
November 1961. The purpose of “Farm Gate” and subsequent AvFID detachments was to 




                                                 
5 Wray R. Johnson, “Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense,” Airpower Journal 11, no.1 (1997):  
69. 
6 Philip D. Chinnery, Air Commando (New York:  St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 1997), 5–6. 
7Johnson, “Whither Aviation,” 70. 
8Johnson, “Whither Aviation,” 70. 
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U.S. involvement in Vietnam increased, the Air Force increased the size of its special 
forces. Within a little over a year the 4400th CCTS was absorbed into the reactivated 1st 
Air Commando Group, which became subordinate to the Special Air Warfare Center in 
April 1962.9   
After Vietnam, the military establishment, including the Air Force, vowed to 
never fight another war like Vietnam and attempted to purge itself of irregular warfare, 
particularly COIN. The term COIN was discarded and replaced by “internal defense and 
development” (IDAD).  “Stability operations” was the term used to describe operational 
activities associated with IDAD.10   
Despite not having units dedicated to the AvFID mission, the Air Force still 
continued to perform AvFID missions, but on an ad hoc basis. However, things started to 
change for special operations in 1986 with the passage of the Goldwater Nichols Act. 
Following this legislation, USSOCOM and AFSOC were formed. Yet, the Air Force’s 
reluctance to embrace the AvFID mission, to include its own special operations 
community’s reluctance, can be seen in how long it took for AFSOC to activate a unit 
dedicated to AvFID.11  In 1994, Air Force Special Operations Command finally activated 
the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS), the first and only Air Force active duty 
AvFID unit. For the last 18 years, the 6th SOS and its advisors deployed around the 
world and trained, advised, and assisted numerous countries. In 2009 and 2010 these 
countries included “Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Jordan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, 
Korea, Thailand, Poland, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad 




                                                 
9Johnson, “Whither Aviation,” 73. 
10Johnson, “Whither Aviation,” 4. 
11See Wray R. Johnson, “Whither Aviation Foreign Internal Defense,” for more on why it took so long 
to form an AvFID unit. 
12“Factsheets:  6th Special Operations Squadron,” Hurlburt Field, February 24, 2011, accessed 
November 20, 2012, http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3496. 
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the 6th SOS to Duke Field, home of the 919th Special Operations Wing, a U.S. Air Force 
Reserve unit, signaling that the bulk of the AvFID mission will transition to the 
Reserves.13   
As for what exactly AvFID is, published guidance can be found in United States 
Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2–3.1, Foreign Internal Defense. Interestingly 
enough, the term AvFID is not precisely defined in AFDD 2–3.1. After a close read one 
can ascertain that AvFID generally entails working by, with, and through the host 
nation’s air forces to achieve the U.S.’s and that host nation’s strategic and operational 
objectives.14  Yet, according to Air Force doctrine, AvFID involves much more than just 
training other air forces. Notably, “FID is a very large domain encompassing the total 
political, economic, informational, and military support the U.S. provides to enable other 
governments to field viable internal defense and development (IDAD) programs for 
counterinsurgency, combating terrorism, and counter-narcotics.”15  For this reason, given 
this span of responsibilities, it seems critical to assess the political, economic, and social 
situation prior to analyzing the role U.S. AvFID has played abroad in helping other states 
conduct counterinsurgency campaigns. 
  
                                                 
13Michelle Vickers, “Hurlburt Squadron Moves to Duke Field,” 919th Special Operations Wing, 
October 1, 2012, accessed November 5, 2012, 
http://www.919sow.afrc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123322133. 
14 United States Air Force, “Air Force Doctrine Document 2–3.1, Foreign Internal Defense,” 17 
September 2007, 2. 
15 United States Air Force, “AFDD 2–3.1, Foreign Internal Defense,” 1. 
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II. THE PHILIPPINES 
 Hukbalahap, or Huk (pronounced “hook”) for short, is the abbreviation for the 
Tagalog phrase “Hukbo Na Bayan Laban Sa Hapon” which literally translates into 
“People’s Army [To Fight] Against Japan.”16  As the name suggests, the origins of the 
Huk insurgency would seem to lie in the Japanese occupation of the Philippines during 
WWII. However, this would be an inaccurate assessment. Even though the Huks were 
veterans of the resistance movement against the Japanese in WWII, the origin of the Huk 
insurgency dates back to Filipino peasant unrest during the 1930s.17 
Central Luzon in the Philippines is the area where the people of the Huk rebellion 
lived.18  This is a lowland area of the Philippines and is primarily farmland. The farms 
were owned by wealthy datu (landowners) and the land was worked by tau (peasants).19  
The datu-tau relationship, commonly referred to as the datuk, was akin to a familial 
bond.20  According to Benedict J. Kerkvliet, “[the tau] were more than tillers of his land. 
They were people on whom he could rely to promote his interests out of gratitude to him. 
They were his tenants. He could ask them, for example, to defend his property against 
bandits or rival claimants and to vote for his favorite candidates.”21  In a similar fashion, 
the datu “provided start-up loans, funded weddings and other ceremonies, and were 
generally concerned about the well-being of their tau.”22  In essence, the datu and tau 
took care of each other and helped each other in times of need. Unfortunately, the 
 
                                                 
16 Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T.R. Bohannan, Counter-Guerrilla Operations:  The Philippine 
Experience (Westport, CT:  Praeger Security International, 2006), viii. 
17 Wray R. Johnson and Paul Dimech, “Foreign Internal Defense and the Hukbalahap:  A Model 
Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 4, no. 1 (1993):  31. 
18 Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk  Rebellion:  A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Berkeley, 
CA:  University of California Press, 1977), 1. 
19 James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars:  Fighting Insurgents and 
Terrorists (Lawrence, KS:  University Press of Kansas, 2003), 113. 
20 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 113. 
21 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 17. 
22 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 114. 
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intricacies of this relationship started to erode at the end of the Spanish colonial period 
(1565–1898) and declined at a more exponential rate after U.S. annexation of the 
Philippines in 1899.23   
There are several factors that help explain the deterioration of the datuk. First, 
with support from the U.S., the Filipino economy transitioned from self-sustainment to 
capitalism. The economy went from being internally focused to one centered on exports 
and generating revenue. As this transformation in the economy occurred, the datu were 
incentivized to focus more on the output from their farmland and less on their 
relationship with the tau. Fixated solely on profit, the datu stopped making interest-free 
loans, tacked on high interest rates to loans that in all likelihood would not be repaid, 
demanded the tau perform odd jobs around the farm without pay, and generally stopped 
caring about the tau.24  The tau thought these actions violated the spirit of their 
relationship and felt exploited.   
Second, the Philippines experienced tremendous population growth between 1903 
and 1939 as the overall Filipino population more than doubled from seven million to 
sixteen million people.25  During the same time period, the four principal provinces of 
Central Luzon experienced a similar rate of population change as “the population 
increased from 717,000 to over 1.3 million people.”26  Since most people in Central 
Luzon made their living by farming, the supply of arable land did not meet the new 
demand generated by the huge increase in population. By 1930, the tau became frantic 
for land to work on. Furthermore, the increase in demand for arable land by the tau 
placed the datu in a position where they could take advantage of the tau. As Kerkvliet 
points out, “if for some reason a landowner forced a tenant to leave, the tenant had less 
hope than before of finding another landowner. The other side of the coin was that 
landowners could demand more from tenants and threaten to replace anyone who refused 
                                                 
23 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 113. 
24 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 13–17. 
25 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 17. 
26 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 17. 
 9
their terms. And as they became more concerned about making profits, their terms 
became stiffer and more strictly enforced.”27   
Finally, the government also played a significant role in the downfall of the datuk. 
Around the same time the U.S. annexed the Philippines, the central government started to 
expand its reach into the rural areas.28  One new government law was to survey and title 
all land in the Philippines. This action was in direct conflict with the datuk as it “placed 
landownership, based on a government-recognized title, above the peasant’s traditional 
right to landholding, based on his ties to the landlord and on his continued use of the 
land.”29  Consequently, the datu’s title became more valued than the tau’s claims since 
the tau’s claims were primarily verbal agreements with the datu. If there was a dispute, 
the datu would be in a better position for an outcome in his favor.30  Clearly, the 
initiation of the survey and title favored the datu and helped to facilitate the erosion of the 
datuk. The effects of the shift from self-sustainment to capitalism, along with the 
tremendous population increase in such a short period of time and the government’s 
enactment of the mandatory issuance of title makes it easy to see how the datuk 
deteriorated at a quick rate after the U.S. annexed the Philippines.   
These events happened before the Japanese invasion of the Philippines in 1941. 
After the Japanese invaded and successfully ousted the U.S., the peasants located in the 
Central Luzon area formed the Huk resistance movement. To increase their chances of 
survival against the Japanese, the Hukbalahap formed a united front with various other 
resistance groups in the Philippines. It was also at this point in time that the Huks became 
associated with the communists.   
The Communist Party in the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Pilapinas, or 
PKP) was officially organized on November 7th, 1930. Approximately two years later, 
the Filippino government outlawed the PKP and the party’s leaders were forced to 
operate covertly. Subsequently, the leaders of the PKP united with the Socialist Party of 
                                                 
27 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 18. 
28 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 22. 
29 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 22. 
30 Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion, 22. 
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the Philippines and openly declared their allegiance to the Communist International.31  In 
1941 the Japanese invaded and the PKP went underground once again. Following the 
Japanese occupation, the communist leaders from the PKP and Socialist Party infiltrated 
the newly formed Huk organization. The communists astutely realized that the war 
presented a unique opportunity to capture power and popularity among the peasants.32  In 
addition, the communists foresaw that if they successfully expelled the Japanese from the 
Philippines, a power grab for control of the country would develop.   
The communists successfully infiltrated the Huks. They were so successful that 
eventually most government officials and scholars claimed that communists and the Huks 
were one and the same. In retrospect, this proved to be an inaccurate assessment of the 
situation. Wray R. Johnson and Paul J. Dimech point out two reasons:  “first, the 
ideology of the PKP was incompatible with the worldview of the Filipino peasant, and 
second; the PKP could not put into effect its policies when they conflicted with the 
movement’s innate momentum.”33  The majority of the people in central Luzon were 
Christian. The piety of the Filipinos proved too much of an impediment for the 
communists to overcome. The PKP were also not very well organized, and when they 
tried to implement certain communist initiatives in the central Luzon area, they failed. 
Furthermore, when many former Huks and Huk supporters were interviewed at the 
conclusion of the Huk rebellion, they displayed their displeasure at mistakenly being 
called communists.34 
As the communists predicted, a power grab for control of the state developed after 
the U.S. drove the Japanese from the Philippines. The United States Armed Forces Far 
East (USAFFE) was the American-led resistance group, comprised of Americans who 
stayed behind after the Japanese invasion. 35  The Huks did not get along with USAFFE, 
as USAFFE also included members of the previous Philippine regime. For their part, 
                                                 
31 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 115. 
32 Robert Ross Smith, The Hukbalahap Insurgency:  Economic, Political, and Military Factors 
(Washington, D.C.:  Department of the Army), 23. 
33 Johnson and Dimech, “Foreign Internal Defense and the Hukbalahap,” 35–36. 
34 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 114. 
35 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 115–116. 
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those in USAFFE did not like the Huks given the communists’ infiltration into the Huks’ 
ranks. Tension was high between the two groups, often resulting in armed fights. 
Eventually “USAFFE declared that any guerrillas not members of the USAFFE (that is, 
the Huks) were regarded as enemies of the U.S. government.”36   
Once General Douglas MacArthur regained control of the Philippines, the U.S. 
decided to allow wartime collaborators back into the new Filipino government “in order 
to reclaim the status quo ante bellum.”37  General MacArthur also started to meddle in 
Filipino politics and decided to set up his friend, Manuel Roxas, to become the next 
president. Roxas happened to be a wealthy landowner in central Luzon and was anti-
Huk.38   
Needless to say, these post-Japanese occupation events did not sit well with the 
Huks. Furthermore, on July 4th, 1946 the Philippines became independent with elections 
to be held later that year. The Huks participated and won six seats in the Filipino 
Congress.39  One went to Luis Taruc, one of the Huks’ main leaders during the Japanese 
occupation and soon to be leader of the Huks overall. However, newly elected President 
Manuel Roxas did not allow the Huks to take their seats. This provoked an outcry from 
the peasants in central Luzon and boosted the Huks’ popularity. Hostilities soon 
followed, and before the U.S. realized it, the Filipino government was facing a strong 
insurgency. 
In 1948 President Roxas outlawed the Huks and confronted the insurgency with a 
“‘mailed fist.’”40  He reorganized the Philippine military police into the Philippine 
Constabulary (PC) and placed a Japanese collaborationist, Alberto Ramos, in charge of 
the newly formed organization.41  The methods the PC used to quell the insurgency were 
                                                 
36 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 116. 
37 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 115. 
38 Cecil B. Currey, Edward Lansdale:  The Unquiet American (Boston:  Houghton Mifflin Company), 
34–35. 
39 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 116. 
40 Currey, Edward Lansdale, 38 and 49. 
41 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 116. 
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brutal and the PC did not differentiate between peasants and insurgents. Specifically, “the 
special tactic of these [PC] squadrons was to cordon off areas; anyone they caught inside 
the cordon was considered an enemy.”42 Many innocent people were killed. Roxas’ 
‘mailed fist’ strategy was devastating to the central Luzon peasants, but it did not succeed 
in quelling the rebellion. In actuality, Roxas’ policies further drove the peasants into the 
Huks’ open arms. The majority of central Luzon peasants either supported the Huks or 
joined their ranks to fight the Filipino government. As the Huks’ ranks swelled, their 
leadership eventually changed the organization’s name to “Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng 
Balayan, or ‘People’s Liberation Army’”43 They were still referred to as Huks, and the 
area they controlled in central Luzon was called “Huklandia.”   
In April 1948, President Roxas abruptly died of natural causes and Vice President 
Epido Quirino succeeded him.44  Unfortunately, President Quirino did not alter any of the 
government’s methods for dealing with the insurgency. Hostilities only intensified and 
U.S. leaders did not know whether the Quirino government would survive. As a result, 
the U.S. decided to increase its level of assistance. 
In late 1950, President Truman signed National Security Council (NSC) 84/C. 
The document attributed the insurgency to grievances felt by the peasantry and 
recommended the U.S. advise and convince the Philippine government to implement the 
proper political, economic, and social reforms.45  NSC 84/C was a unique document in 
that it accurately assessed the situation in the Philippines and did not focus solely on 
military force as a solution to the problem. Clearly, President Truman and his NSC team 
were aware of the failed ‘mailed fist’ operations that both Roxas and Quirino 
implemented. NSC 84/C also paved the way for an increase in military and economic 
assistance to the Philippines. From 1947 to 1952, U.S. aid reached a total of $20 million, 
and from 1952 to 1954 assistance reached a total of $27 million.46  This was a relatively 
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small amount of aid when compared to the amount the U.S. spent in Korea from 1950 to 
1953. According to a Congressional Research Service report, the Korean War cost the 
U.S. $30 billion.47  Given the Administration’s accurate assessment of the Huk 
insurgency together with the assistance rendered, it becomes easier to understand how the 
Philippine government was finally able to successfully counter the Huks.   
How exactly did the Philippine government pull out a “win” against the Huks?  
Ramon Magsaysay and two U.S. officers, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale 
and U.S. Army Major Charles “Bo” Bohannan, proved to be critical advisors to the 
successful counterinsurgency campaign against the Huks. Lansdale and Bohannan arrived 
in the Philippines in 1950. Although working for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Lansdale and Bohannan were assigned to the Joint United States Military Advisory 
Group (JUSMAG). Both Lansdale and Bohannan had previous experience in the 
Philippines during and after WWII. Lansdale worked for the Office of Strategic Services, 
the predecessor of the CIA, and was an expert in psychological operations. Bohannan 
fought in the Philippines during WWII and was a survivor of the Bataan Death March.48  
Lansdale and Bohannan both still had numerous contacts within the Philippines and were 
well thought of by Filipinos.   
Lansdale first met Ramon Magsaysay in Washington D.C in early 1950. 
Magsaysay, who had fought against the Japanese, was a Philippine congressman at the 
time. During their first meeting, Lansdale regarded Magsaysay as the kind of critical 
leader that the Filipinos desperately needed.49  By the time Lansdale and Bohannan 
arrived in the Philippines, Magsaysay was appointed President Quirino’s Secretary of 
Defense. Magsaysay and Lansdale viewed the insurgency in much the same way. From 
the peasants’ perspective, the government was unjust and not functioning properly. The 
Huks received the peasants’ support because the Huks represented a better option than 
that offered by the Filipino government in Manilla. Thus, in order to crush the 
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insurgency, the government needed to change and to implement reforms that appealed to 
and benefited the peasantry. The reforms would display to the peasantry that the Filipino 
government existed to serve its people. At the same time they would undermine support 
for the Huks and their legitimacy.   
Lansdale and Magsaysay formed a remarkable team. As the Secretary of National 
Defense, Magsaysay was able to implement numerous effective solutions that focused 
primarily on the professionalization of the military forces. Specifically, Magsaysay 
ensured that the military personnel, when in direct contact with the local population, 
treated the peasants with respect and did not commit human rights violations. As a result, 
this reform measure imparted a favorable image of the Philippines’ military and 
government upon the peasantry. In late 1953, Magsaysay was elected President of the 
Philippines. As president, Magsaysay was able to continue his reform of the Philippine 
government and apply the political, social, and economic reforms needed to successfully 
defeat the Huk insurgency.   
As for the role that U.S. AvFID played in helping to defeat the insurgency, it is 
important to note that Philippine aviation did not even become organized until 1935. The 
U.S. played a major role in assisting with the establishment of the Philippine 
Constabulary Air Corps, which was later called the Philippine Army Air Corps 
(PAAC).50  The U.S. provided training on the basic tactics, techniques, and procedures of 
aviation. During WWII, the PAAC had been destroyed. However, with the end of the 
Japanese occupation the PAAC was re-established. In 1947, the Philippine Air Force 
(PAF) became a separate service.51 
As the Huk insurgency got underway in 1946, the PAAC was neither properly 
trained nor equipped to provide airpower in an effective manner. As a result, the U.S. 
increased its assistance to the PAF. Through JUSMAG, the PAF received numerous 
aircraft to include T-6s, BT-13s, P-51s, C-47s, and L-5s.52  The PAF also received pilot 
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training in the U.S., with Filipino pilots who survived WWII receiving refresher 
courses.53  For the most part, the PAF operated independently, without U.S. direct 
involvement in the fight against the Huks. The important point to note here is the fact that 
the U.S.’s primary role was to advise the PAF on how to employ airpower versus 
employing airpower for it. Lansdale and Bohannan consistently tried to ensure the fight 
against the Huks remained the Philippines’ and not the U.S.’s fight.   
As for how the PAF effectively employed airpower against the Huk insurgency, it 
was very creative. Lansdale, himself an Air Force officer and an expert at psychological 
operations, advised and encouraged Magsaysay and the PAF to use airpower in a more 
unconventional manner. One psychological operation that the PAF consistently 
performed was called the “eye of God.”54  Lansdale was familiar with the use of spotter 
aircraft against tank formations during WWII. With the “eye of God,” essentially the 
pilot would use a loudspeaker and fly over enemy formations to broadcast messages that 
would make the enemy feel vulnerable to the “all-seeing eye.”55  The PAF was able to 
perform the “eye of God” tactic through the use of old WWII U.S. Navy bullhorns 
designed for amphibious landings. Lansdale claimed to have found the bullhorns in 
Washington, D.C., and brought them with him to the Philippines.56  Lansdale recalled 
one of the more successful “eye of God” operations as the following: 
On this day a Huk squadron was being pursued by an infantry company 
from a BCT [Battalion Combat Team], which had not been able to make 
contact with the elusive guerrillas. The officer went up in the aircraft to 
see if he could spot the Huks from the air. He saw them, and he saw also 
that his troops were hopelessly behind in their pursuit…Through the bull 
horn he shouted down at the Huks below, telling them that they were 
doomed because he and his troops knew all about them and soon would 
catch them…He called down to the Huks by name, pretending to 
recognize individuals. As the aircraft made a final circle, the bull horn sent 
his amplified voice down with these parting words:  ‘Thank you, our 
friend in our squadron, for all the information.’  Then he flew away…The 
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BCT found out later that the mention of a mysterious ‘friend’ in their 
ranks had aroused the Huk’s darkest suspicions of one another. Three of 
them were singled out and executed on the spot. The words had inflicted 
as many casualties on the enemy as troops could have done in a running 
fight.57 
Airpower was used for more than just psychological operations. Magsaysay and 
Lansdale recognized that the armed fight against the Huks needed to be primarily won on 
the ground. However, the Philippine government had already tried and failed to do this 
through its ‘mailed fist’ technique. As Secretary of Defense, Magsaysay realized his army 
needed to be professionalized and needed to treat the local peasants with dignity and 
respect. With Lansdale at his side, he strove to accomplish this through his unannounced 
surprise inspections of all units throughout the Philippines, especially in Huklandia. The 
only way Magsaysay and Lansdale were able to do this was via air transport.   
According to Corum and Johnson, surprise inspections were “one of the more 
celebrated capabilities that PAF L-5s and other light airplanes brought to the pacification 
effort.”58  Lansdale claimed that their impact was “electrifying.”59  In addition, Lansdale 
recalled a specific instance of a government employee who was afraid to steal stamps 
because Magsaysay might show up. The interesting part of the story was that the 
government employee worked in the post office and Magsaysay, the Secretary of 
Defense, had zero authority over the postal service.60  Meanwhile, when Magsaysay 
arrived via aircraft, his presence may have had an even bigger impact on the local 
population than on the military. The peasants actually saw an important member of the 
government visiting their farms and felt that Magsaysay cared about their general 
welfare. In return, Magsaysay received first-hand accounts about how the government 
was or was not living up to its responsibilities. He obtained many ideas for reforms from 
these trips with Lansdale. These proved crucial to regaining the local population’s 
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support for the government and, as the government earned the population’s support, the 
Huks lost the support they needed to continue their campaign against it.   
Other noteworthy uses of airpower during the Huk insurgency included 
reconnaissance, close air support, air resupply of troops, and troop transport. The aircraft 
used for reconnaissance would spot enemy ground formations and then relay the 
intelligence back to the Philippine ground forces. Occasionally the PAF would provide 
close air support, but it tried to limit this in order to avoid civilian casualties.61  
According to Lansdale, the long range patrols into the hinterlands of Huklandia could not 
have happened without the air resupply efforts of the PAF.62  Resupply also had a 
tremendous psychological impact during the war. As Colonel Napolean D. Valeriano and 
Major “Bo” Bohannan point out in their co-authored book, Counter-Guerrilla 
Operations: The Philippine Experience, “food for soldiers, especially for troops on patrol 
or actively engaged in operations, is often a problem that generates unnecessary civilian 
hostility.”63 The PAF realized the importance of food to the Philippine soldiers in the 
field and devised a method of air-drops that was eventually shared with colleagues at Fort 
Bragg. In essence, they inserted fresh eggs into a volleyball, surrounded by hay or straw 
in a box. The box was then air-dropped by the PAF. According to Colonel Valeriano, 
“some of my officers would swear on official oath they were able to receive fresh eggs by 
this method.”64 
Without a doubt, the Philippine counterinsurgent forces could not have employed 
airpower effectively without U.S. assistance. Even though it was not called AvFID at the 
time, the United States supported the PAF through AvFID with the necessary aircraft, 
equipment, and training. The U.S. also effectively implemented FID when the U.S. 
correctly assessed the situation in the Philippines and inserted an impressive advisory 
team to include Lansdale and Bohannan. This support, in addition to key advice from 
Lansdale and Bohannan, proved to be critical to the success of the Philippine 
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counterinsurgency campaign. Overall, the role of airpower was not a decisive factor. 
However, air power certainly played a critical role and without the training and the 
advice from the U.S., the PAF would not have been able to conduct missions from the air 
as effectively as it did. Therefore, it can be concluded that U.S. AvFID proved itself to be 
an effective as well as a critical component in the Philippine government’s overall 




Vietnam is located on the eastern side of the Indochina Peninsula, covers 
approximately 331,000 square kilometers65, and borders China, Cambodia, Laos, and the 
Gulfs of Thailand and Tonkin. In the mid-1960s, both North and South Vietnam had 
approximately 34 million people66 and was considered a culturally and ethnically 
homogenous society.67  Nevertheless, Vietnam did have some ethnic minority groups, to 
include 3,500,000 million Montagnards, a French term for “mountain people living 
almost exclusively in the hill, mountain, and plateau areas,”68over 1,000,000 Chinese, 
700,000 Cambodians in former districts of the Kingdom of Cambodia,69 and a significant 
Buddhist population.   
Over the course of its history, Vietnam has been the target of numerous invasions 
and occupations. First invaded and colonized by the Chinese 2,000 years ago, Vietnam 
remained a Chinese colony for the next 1,000 years.70  The Vietnamese always resented 
and resisted the Chinese throughout their occupation. Finally, in 939 A.D., the 
Vietnamese successfully expelled their Chinese rulers.71  Over the next 400 years the 
Chinese would consistently attempt to reconquer Vietnam, sometimes succeeding, 
sometimes failing. However, the Chinese recognized Vietnam’s independence in 1426 
and did not try to return again until 1788, when they failed.72  The departure of the 
Chinese in 1426 did not mean, however, an end to foreign interference. 
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In 1540, Portugal arrived and became the first western nation to exploit Vietnam. 
The British and the Dutch soon followed in the late 17th century and broke up the 
Portuguese control. However, the Brits and the Dutch did not stay long since they did not 
find Vietnam to be particularly profitable for them.73 Alexandre de Rhodes, a French 
missionary, arrived in Vietnam in 1627 and is credited with adapting the Vietnamese 
language to the Roman alphabet.74  From this point onward, French influence in Vietnam 
exponentially increased to the point where, by 1884, Vietnam’s rulers were willing to 
accept Vietnam becoming a French protectorate.75 As with the Chinese occupation, 
though, the French ran into some resistance.   
Needless to say, the extent of foreign influence in Vietnam has been considerable. 
With regard to Chinese influence, “Confucianism, Taoism, language forms, political 
theory, and …[Chinese] military theory”76 are prevalent. Of particular importance, the 
Vietnamese perfected the art of guerrilla warfare; against the Chinese they “relied on 
mobile methods of warfare, abandon[ed] the cities, avoid[ed] frontal attacks, and 
harass[ed] his enemies until, confused and exhausted, they were ripe for final attack.”77  
Though French influence was not as profound as that of the Chinese, it still made its 
mark. For example, some Vietnamese had the opportunity to study in France, to include 
Ho Chi Minh. In addition, most educated Vietnamese spoke French. When the U.S. 
became involved in Vietnam in the 1950s, the ability to speak French became a valued 
trait in the U.S. military. Otherwise, U.S. personnel relied on French or Vietnamese 
translators.   
Yet, even though the Vietnamese were influenced by Chinese and French 
thinking, a strong sentiment of Vietnamese nationalism ran through the population. 
Ironically, Vietnam’s strong sense of nationalism had roots in “the Chinese concept of the 
Mandate of Heaven, which embodies several time-honored duties. The principal task of 
                                                 
73 Timothy J. Lomperis, The War Everyone Lost – And Won: America’s Intervention in Viet Nam’s 
Twin Struggles (Baton Rouge, LA:  Louisiana State University Press, 1984), 22. 
74 Karnow, Vietnam:  A History, 673. 
75 Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, 24.   
76 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 228. 
77 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam:  A History (New York:  Penguin Books, 1983), 101. 
 21
any holder of the Mandate of Heaven in Viet Nam has been the preservation of 
Vietnamese identity.”78  Thus, even though the Vietnamese have always borrowed from 
others, they invariably put their own twist on what they borrowed. The Vietnamese did 
this to ensure that their identity was not lost.79  As such, “it has always been the almost 
sacred charge of Viet Nam’s rulers to rid the country of foreign invaders and 
meddlers.”80 Given the concept of the Mandate of Heaven and the importance of 
Vietnamese identity, one can begin to understand the strong sense of nationalism that the 
Vietnamese possessed. In addition, one can also ascertain why the Vietnamese always put 
up a stiff resistance against foreigners meddling in Vietnamese affairs, regardless of the 
foreigners’ intentions.   
In 1940, the Japanese invaded and assumed control of Vietnam from the French. 
The Japanese positioned Bao Dai as emperor of Vietnam. During the Japanese 
occupation, the Vietnamese nationalists resisted. According to Kahin and Lewis, “the 
most effective nationalist organization, the Communist Party attracted many Vietnamese 
patriots who had no particular interest in communism. Here, then, were the beginnings of 
a fusion of nationalism and communism that was to develop much further.”81 The 
Communist Party operated militarily under the Viet Minh organization led by Ho Chi 
Minh and his military commander, Vo Nguyen Giap. Ironically, Ho Chi Minh and 
General Giap operated with U.S. personnel from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
and French resistance fighters against the Japanese (see Figure 1).   
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OSS Deer Team members pose with Viet Minh leaders Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap during training 
at Tan Trao in August 1945. Deer Team members standing, l to r, are Rene Defourneaux, (Ho), Allison 
Thomas, (Giap), Henry Prunier and Paul Hoagland, far right. 
 
Figure 1.  OSS Deer Team members with Minh and Giap82 
The Viet Minh assisted the OSS to recover U.S. pilots shot down by the Japanese. 
In addition, the OSS utilized the Viet Minh’s intelligence networks to gain valuable 
information about Japanese occupation forces.83 The Viet Minh established themselves as 
a potent force, and, as WWII came to a close, Ho Chi Minh strategically positioned 
himself and the Viet Minh to take over Vietnam. However, Ho Chi Minh mistakenly 
thought that independence would be granted by the French. After Japan surrendered in 
1945, the French attempted to re-establish its colonial rule in Indochina.   
As soon as Ho Chi Minh realized that the French would not relinquish control and 
grant Vietnam independence, he resurrected the Viet Minh military organization with 
Giap at the helm, and the Viet Minh recovered their hidden WWII weapons. In addition, 
Ho Chi Minh successfully convinced Bao Dai to relinquish his position as emperor, 
which paved the way for Ho Chi Minh’s communist party to take over in Hanoi. Even 
though Bao Dai subsequently left Vietnam for Paris to live in exile for the remainder of 
his days, he still influenced Vietnamese politics. On September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh 
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established the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and declared Vietnam independent.84  
Shortly thereafter, the French and the Viet Minh went to war. 
At first, Giap attempted to decimate the French via conventional tactics. After 
suffering defeats, Giap switched to guerrilla warfare tactics and slowly built up his army 
into a formidable fighting force.85 The French had a tough time against the Viet Minh 
and their guerrilla tactics. As a result, the French asked the U.S. for help. President 
Truman established the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) in 1950 
to assist the French.86 After President Eisenhower took office in January 1953, Vietnam 
became his administration’s problem.   
On June 23, 1953, an American team led by General John W. “Iron Mike” 
O’Daniel and then Colonel Edward Lansdale, U.S. Air Force, arrived in Vietnam to 
assess the situation and provide recommendations to French General Henri Navarre.87  
Lansdale came directly from the Philippines where he assisted President Ramon 
Magsaysay defeat the Hukbalahap rebellion. After Lansdale spent about six weeks in 
Vietnam, he observed, “The majority of the Vietnamese, still hungering for 
independence, had no side to join. They were opposed to both the Communist Vietminh 
and the French. As the war raged around their families and homes, they gave lip service 
to whichever side was locally dominant, in order to stay alive.”88 Lansdale concluded that 
the French were not going to win unless they made drastic reforms that placed 
Vietnamese nationalists in charge of running their own country.89 Interestingly enough, 
Lansdale’s assessment totally differed from General O’Daniel’s optimistic assessment. 
O’Daniel predicted that “Navarre would achieve ‘decisive defeat’ of Viet Minh guerrilla 
forces by 1955.”90   
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The lack of synchronization between Lansdale’s and O’Daniel’s reports is highly 
revealing of what was to come with further U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The war 
between the French and the Viet Minh culminated in the large conventional battle at Dien 
Bien Phu in 1954, when 16,000 French troops were surrounded by 40,000 Viet Minh in a 
basin enclosed by wooden hills.91 The results were disastrous and the French 
surrendered. Dien Bien Phu is considered by most historians to be the straw that broke 
the camel’s back for the French in Vietnam and the battle that led to the Geneva 
Convention peace agreements.    
At the Geneva Convention, the French agreed to hand over control of their colony 
to the Vietnamese. In addition, sovereignty was granted to Ho Chi Minh’s nation-state 
north of the seventeenth parallel with Hanoi as the capital, while Bao Dai was given the 
southern half of the state of Vietnam with Saigon as its capital. Both sides agreed to hold 
general elections in 1956 to reunify the country.92  But, still in exile status in France, Bao 
Dai had no intention of giving up his luxurious lifestyle. Instead, he placed Ngo Dinh 
Diem, a vocal opponent of communism, at the helm of South Vietnam as Prime Minister.   
The insurgency in South Vietnam began as soon as Diem took office. The 
insurgents’ aim was to reunify Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh’s communist government 
and to remove all foreign interference. It is tough to pinpoint exactly which groups 
considered themselves part of the insurgency since many different groups resisted the 
Diem regime. Those that were most prominent included “communists, the religious 
sects,”93 former Viet Minh soldiers, and members of organized crime. However, the 
Diem regime placed most of the blame for the violence on the remaining Viet Minh 
soldiers still located in South Vietnam.94 Eventually, the insurgents came to be 
collectively referred to as the Viet Cong.   
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With Diem confronted by insurgency, the U.S. began to be more involved in 
Vietnam. After losing China to communism and only achieving an armistice in Korea, 
the U.S. was very concerned with “‘falling dominoes.’”95 Since neither President Truman 
nor President Eisenhower was willing to commit U.S. combat troops, the U.S. decided to 
conduct an “advise and assistance” effort.   
In the wake of his success in the Philippines, the U.S. sent Edward Lansdale back 
to Vietnam in 1954 with the hope he could achieve another success. Lansdale, working 
undercover for the CIA, belonged to a group called the Saigon Military Mission (SMM). 
SMM’s mission was “to assist in the birth of a southern government that could 
successfully compete with and oppose Ho’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”96  In this 
capacity, Lansdale developed a close relationship with Diem and became his principal 
U.S. advisor.   
Diem initially satisfied most U.S. bureaucrats with his efforts to suppress 
communism. However, as Diem fought communism, he also suppressed every other form 
of opposition. An “autocratic Confucian,”97 Diem did not allow for his opposition to 
form political parties and his government often responded against minority groups with a 
mailed fist. In mid-1963, government forces fired upon and killed Buddhists celebrating 
the birthday of Gautama Siddhartha Buddha.98  Buddhists throughout Vietnam protested 
and a few responded by burning themselves in public. These self-immolations had a 
profound impact. The impression they made that stuck was that Diem’s “democracy” was 
so bad people were willing to kill themselves rather than live under his regime. In 
addition, Diem’s brother and most trusted advisor, Nhu, established the Cao Lao, his own 
political party. The Cao Lao served as the Diem regime’s political police and “resorted to 
torture, terror, or murder to silence those who refused to join or who spoke out against 
it.”99   
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Furthermore, Diem put an end to local elections and placed personnel loyal to him 
and his family in charge at the local level. Essentially, Diem only wanted people loyal to 
him and his family to control Vietnam. Despite the efforts made by Lansdale and his 
team, the U.S. was not able to successfully convince Diem that his government needed 
to:  be responsive to and representative of the population, address the legitimate 
grievances of the population, and serve to protect the rights of individuals, especially 
minorities. While Diem tightened his un-democratic rule, the U.S. continued to finance 
his government. This did not help the situation; especially since Diem made sure the huge 
influx of U.S. aid served his interests and those of the small urban middle class 
disproportionately. Diem saw no reason to change conditions for the disadvantaged 
classes or the peasants in the countryside.100  As Kahin and Lewis point out, “Saigon 
could much more easily insulate itself from the troublesome realities beyond its outskirts. 
U.S. aid thus provided Diem with a degree of financial independence and isolated him 
from basic economic and political realities and reduced his need to appreciate or respond 
to his people’s wants and expectations.”101 
In addition to Lansdale’s efforts, the U.S. military mission established “two 
principal objectives:  first, to create a conventional army of divisional-sized units and 
supporting elements to meet any North Vietnamese invasion; and second, to establish 
‘follow-through programs’ to sustain these conventional forces.”102  The U.S. military 
objective of building a conventional South Vietnamese army to counter a North 
Vietnamese invasion reflects the U.S.’s misunderstandings about the Vietnamese 
insurgency. From the U.S. military’s perspective the insurgency was a precursor to a full-
scale conventional invasion by North Vietnam.103  Consequently, the U.S. felt it needed 
to build and prepare the South Vietnamese army for a conventional war. In addition, the 
U.S. military incorrectly believed that the overall problem in Vietnam was a military 
problem when, instead, most insurgents’ aim was to reunify Vietnam and remove foreign 
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interference. Underlying problems had more to do with political, social, and economic 
factors. Unfortunately, the U.S. military leadership did not understand this, as was made 
brazenly obvious when “Gen. Earle Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff from 1962 to 1964, 
stated that ‘the essence of the problem in Vietnam is military.’”104 
It is also important to point out here that the U.S.’s two military objectives never 
took into account how the military piece fit into the overall South Vietnamese 
government plans to counter the Viet Cong. In counterinsurgency, the purpose of the 
military is to support the government and, ideally, its reforms, as well as to protect the 
people from the insurgents. Overall, the government needs to gain the support of its 
people and woo them away from the insurgents, and in the process also de-legitimize the 
insurgents. Unfortunately, the South Vietnamese government’s initiatives, or lack 
thereof, and U.S. military reform initiatives were never aligned throughout the war. 
In January 1961 President Kennedy took office and did not agree with the 
conventional mindset that permeated the Department of Defense. He did not think that, 
given its structure, the U.S. military was capable of adequately responding to 
insurgencies or wars of national liberation that dominated the world scene at the time. 
Consequently, President Kennedy directed the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. 
McNamara, to have the military establish units dedicated to COIN.105  In addition to his 
desire for military units focused on COIN, President Kennedy also wanted units to 
conduct unconventional warfare or covert paramilitary operations against the North 
Vietnamese.106   
Historically, covert paramilitary operations fell under the CIA. However, 
President Kennedy was dissatisfied with the CIA and its recent performance, exemplified 
by the failed Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961. Instead of the CIA, President Kennedy 
wanted the military to be responsible for guerrilla operations in North Vietnam. 
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According to Shultz, “this was the beginning of what would turn into the largest and most 
complex covert-operations campaign carried out by the U.S. government during the Cold 
War. From 1964 until 1972 it would be executed by the military, not the CIA.”107  The 
process by which the covert paramilitary programs in Vietnam were transferred from the 
CIA to the military was known as Operation Switchback.108 
In response to pressure from the Kennedy administration to change the 
conventional dynamic that existed within the DoD, the Air Force activated the 4400th 
Combat Crew Training Squadron (CCTS) at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida on April 14, 
1961.109  The mission of the 4400th CCTS, nicknamed “Jungle Jim,” “was to train 
foreign air force personnel in the application of airpower in COIN.”110 As previously 
discussed, this is the mission of AvFID. However, with President Kennedy’s 
authorization to send U.S. Army Special Forces to Vietnam, Jungle Jim’s mission was 
tweaked. The 4400th would not just be a unit dedicated to training, it was “‘designed to 
fight’” and “to train indigenous airmen while working with and supporting the Special 
Forces, rangers, and irregular forces along the border.”111  In essence, advisors were now 
expected to train the South Vietnamese Air Force for COIN against the Viet Cong and, at 
the same time, assist the U.S. Special Forces in unconventional warfare operations 
against the North Vietnamese (i.e., the missions transferred to the U.S. military via 
Operation Switchback). 
The first detachment of the 4400th CCTS, code-named “Farm Gate,” deployed to 
Vietnam in November 1961. Farm Gate arrived as an independent unit, “but soon came 
under the control of the Second Advanced Echelon, a provisional element of Thirteenth 
Air Force, commanded by Brigadier General [Rollen H.] Anthis.”112 Thirteenth Air 
Force fell under the authority of the Pacific Air Forces Commander, Hickam Air Force 
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Base in Hawaii. The initial purpose of “Farm Gate” and subsequent AvFID detachments 
was to train, advise, and assist the South Vietnamese Air Force to employ airpower 
against the Viet Cong insurgency. However, the Farm Gate airmen believed that they 
would be involved in combat while training the South Vietnamese Air Force.113   
At first, the members of Farm Gate only conducted training and occasionally ran 
support missions for U.S. Army Special Forces. Confused about what they were 
supposed to do and “highly motivated and eager to fight,” the morale of the Farm Gate 
airmen dropped.114  About a month after arriving in Vietnam, Farm Gate was approved 
for combat operations, but only if a Vietnamese was aboard the aircraft being used.115  
This approval marked the beginning of the end of the U.S.’s advising and training 
mission, as Farm Gate started to veer away from training to combat. 
Instead of training and advising the South Vietnamese Air Force, the Farm Gate 
airmen concentrated on fighting the insurgency through close air support and air-to-
ground interdiction missions (i.e., conventional air operations). In addition, they 
performed unconventional warfare missions over North Vietnam. As a result, the 
Vietnamese airmen were pushed aside and placed in a secondary or supporting role to the 
U.S. airmen fighting the war. The war slowly became the U.S.’s fight instead of 
remaining South Vietnam’s war. 
By 1965 the U.S. deployed Army, Air Force, and Marine combat units. It was 
around this time that the AvFID mission completely vanished and the U.S. overtly took 
control of the war effort. Brigadier General Harry C. “Heinie” Aderholt, former 
commander of the 1st Air Commando Wing, was critical of this development and stated, 
“‘Either because the 2nd Advanced Echelon [later the 2d Air Division] in Saigon didn’t 
understand or didn’t give a damn, the Farm Gate boys started flying close air support for 
the Vietnamese army…We should never have had our regular Air Force and Army units 
over there. It should have been dealt with as an insurgency, and it should have been the 
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Vietnamese’s fight and not ours.’”116  The South Vietnamese armed forces that the U.S. 
trained and advised were now assigned to internal defense duties.117  Worse, with the 
South Vietnamese armed forces having been trained for conventional warfare and not 
internal defense, they proved incapable of fighting a superior enemy, the Viet Cong.   
Even though the AvFID mission was thoroughly discarded and ignored, it is still 
important to understand why the Farm Gate airmen resorted to conventional air rather 
than COIN operations. Probably the best analysis is provided by Andrew Krepinevich in 
his look at the U.S. Army in Vietnam and his examination of what he calls “The Army 
Concept of war.”  According to Krepinevich, “The Army Concept of war, is basically, the 
Army’s perception of how wars ought to be waged and is reflected in the way the Army 
organizes and trains its troops for battle. The characteristics of the Army Concept are 
two:  a focus on mid-intensity, or conventional, war and a reliance on high volumes of 
firepower to minimize casualties.”118 Since counterinsurgency operations tend to focus 
on the opposite of what conventional operations require (i.e., “light infantry formations, 
not heavy divisions…firepower restraint, not its widespread application”119), 
conventional operations are largely irrelevant to fighting an insurgency. In fact, 
conventional operations in the form of massive firepower and large movements of foreign 
forces do more harm than good against insurgents. 
Essentially, this means that the U.S. military fought the Viet Cong in a way that 
would not defeat it. The U.S.’s gross misunderstanding of counterinsurgency warfare in 
Vietnam is perhaps best encapsulated in the now-famous exchange between a former 
instructor at the Army War College, Colonel Harry G. Summers Jr., and a North 
Vietnamese colonel after the Vietnam war: “‘You know,’ [Colonel Summers] told a 
North Vietnamese colonel after the war, ‘you never defeated us on the battlefield.’  To 
which his Communist counterpart replied, ‘That may be so, but it is also irrelevant.’”120  
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The same thinking that permeated the Army was also prevalent in the U.S. Air 
Force. U.S. airpower theory can be broken down into “three fundamental tenets:  that 
airpower is inherently offensive, manifestly strategic, and by that fact must be 
independent in order to realize its full potential.”121  Buttressing these three tenets, are 
the concepts of overwhelming firepower and directly attacking an enemy’s forces or an 
enemy’s means of fighting (i.e., logistics routes, communication lines, etc.). The purpose 
of fighting this way is to capitalize on the strategic nature of airpower, prep the battlefield 
for the ground forces to “mop-up” the remaining enemy forces and their war-making 
capacity, and minimize U.S. casualties. General Curtis E. LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff and 
then Chief of Staff of the Air Force from July 1957 to February 1965, “personally 
favored a direct and open response with the necessary strength. He defined ‘necessary’ as 
‘more than is actually necessary to do the job,’ hitting ‘with overwhelming weight’ to 
avoid ‘stretching things out over a period of time.’”122  Such a conception of airpower 
theory works very well against a conventional enemy who has fixed military forces and a 
highly visible war-making infrastructure and capacity. Unfortunately, the Viet Cong 
insurgency had neither of these to target. The insurgency relied on guerrilla warfare, hit 
and run tactics, and a narrative that slowly convinced the Vietnamese people to view the 
Viet Cong and the communists as a better option than the Saigon government. 
The Farm Gate airmen did perform some successful COIN air operations to 
include psychological operations and resupply missions. However, their primary mission 
was definitely combat operations.123 Later, when the U.S. employment of airpower in 
Vietnam was reviewed, General Aderholt “blamed Brigadier General Rollen H. Anthis, 
who had no COIN experience, and his 2d ADVON staff for misusing [Farm Gate]. He 
described Anthis as ‘a raving madman’ who ‘didn’t know shit from Shinola about COIN 
warfare.’”124  Similarly, Neil Sheehan, in A Bright Shining Lie, portrays General Anthis 
as someone who refused to believe that air combat operations and the resulting civilian 
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casualties were driving the Vietnamese people directly into the hands of the communists. 
Worse, Anthis did not believe there was anything wrong with Farm Gate taking over the 
fight from the South Vietnamese. According to Sheehan, “Every service wanted as big a 
role as possible in Vietnam as soon as Kennedy committed the United States to the war. 
The more the Air Force bombed, the bigger its role. If air power was restricted the way it 
ought to be, the Air Force would not have much to do in Vietnam. It was in Anthis’s 
personal interest and the interest of his institution to believe that the bombing furthered 
the war effort, and so he believed it.”125 
Overall, there is quite a bit to extrapolate from the Vietnam experience. First and 
most important, Diem’s and subsequent regimes in Vietnam did not implement political, 
social, and economic reforms sufficient to convince the Vietnamese people that the 
Saigon government was legitimate or had the population’s best interests at heart. From 
the population’s perspective, the Viet Cong came to represent a better option. Second, the 
U.S. military and the South Vietnamese fought the war as if Vietnam was a military 
problem. As described earlier, the reasons for the insurgency were political, social, and 
economic. The military effort needed to be coordinated with and subordinate to the 
political, social, and economic efforts of the government. Third, the AvFID advisors were 
tasked to perform missions other than AvFID (i.e., covert paramilitary 
operations/unconventional warfare). Unfortunately, a unit can only do so much. If given 
multiple mission sets, the unit will invariably have to prioritize. In the case of Vietnam, 
the Farm Gate airmen preferred combat operations, including the paramilitary covert 
operations, as opposed to the training mission. Finally, for the brief time the U.S. 
advisors trained them, the South Vietnamese were being trained for the wrong fight. 
Worse, the advisors shifted away from training the South Vietnamese to fighting the war 
themselves. Ultimately, the U.S. made the fight its own. From the Vietnamese 
perspective, the U.S. simply replaced the French as another imperialist power, which 
played directly into both the Viet Cong’s and North Vietnam’s hands. 
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IV. EL SALVADOR 
El Salvador, a small country approximately the size of Massachusetts, has the 
highest population density in Central and South America.126  El Salvador became a 
Spanish colony in the 1520s during the age of exploration and colonization. Incentivized 
to generate wealth quickly for the Spanish crown, the colonizers centered the Salvadoran 
economy on exporting a single profitable crop. The “monocrop economy, in which the 
cycles of development and decline were similar and only the crop changed,” focused first 
on cacao, then indigo, and finally coffee.127  To implement in the monocrop economic 
model, the Spanish instituted the hacienda system, which made the indigenous 
population or peasants dependent on landowners for their existence.128  The feudal 
relationship that resulted was further distinguished by the landowners deceiving the 
peasants into accepting loans that the peasants would never be able to repay. This turned 
the peasants into “colonos, or serfs” and permanently tied them to the hacienda. 129  
Aparceria or sharecropping was also prevalent, as was the use of slaves from Africa. 
The monocrop economic model and the hacienda system were not stable systems 
for economic development. As the global economy experienced shifts, from expansion to 
recession or depression, El Salvador’s economy experienced periods of extreme 
expansion and depression, in large part due to the country’s lack of economic 
diversification. During the economically depressed periods, some wealthy landowners 
took advantage of opportunities to, for instance, claim the rights to communal lands 
without properly compensating the previous owner(s).130  This placed what was already a 
small amount of available land in El Salvador into the hands of a controlling minority. 
Subsequently, “the pattern of land concentration led to vast unemployment and 
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underemployment among the peasantry.”131 Adding to un- and underemployment was the 
fact that indigo and coffee cultivation only required peasants to work the fields for three 
months out of the year. As a consequence, those who were fortunate enough to find work 
on the plantations could not find much work the remaining nine months.   
Furthermore, the same few wealthy landowners controlled the political scene in 
San Salvador, often establishing laws that would only benefit them. The peasantry often 
responded, especially during economically depressed times, with protests and violent 
revolts. In turn, the colony’s security forces, paid by and entirely subservient to the 
oligarchy, brutally suppressed the revolts. 
By 1821, El Salvador gained its independence from Spain. However, the 
economic, social, and political effects of Spanish colonization remained deeply 
embedded and helped sow the seeds for future conflict. In fact, after El Salvador’s 
independence, the severity of the revolts only increased in size and frequency. A few 
factors contributed to this situation. First, El Salvador’s government issued a series of 
laws in 1881 and 1882 that “recognized only private property and thereby abolished the 
peasantry’s traditional communal forms of landownership, the ejidos and tierras 
comunales. This abolition of common lands as a legally recognized form of property 
eventually meant the dispossession from their homes—and means of livelihood—of the 
great majority of the rural population.”132  These laws were specifically designed by the 
oligarchy to take land away from the rural poor under the auspices of development. The 
peasants were effectively driven off their communal lands and into the cash-crop 
workforce.133  Consequently, the peasants found the pre-existing economic structure 
overturned, which created further friction between the two classes.   
Second and directly related to the passage of the new economic laws, the 
government found itself increasingly relying on coercion to ensure the oligarchy retained 
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control over its newly acquired lands.134 The peasants did not appreciate this. As one 
would expect, when the government resorted to repression to enforce highly unpopular 
laws, this only added fuel to the existing fire. Third, the government manipulated the 
judicial system to establish new laws that guaranteed an adequate supply of labor to work 
the oligarchy’s lands.135 The manipulation of the judiciary and the subsequent forcing of 
“forced” labor into the cash-crop workforce only deepened the rift between peasants and 
wealthy landowners. Finally, El Salvador’s government and the oligarchy continued to 
support a monocrop export economy and did not make efforts to diversify. As mentioned 
previously, this economic model hurt the peasants particularly during depressed 
economic time periods.   
In the mid to late 20th century, El Salvador experienced further instability, and 
when economic, social, and political conditions are analyzed, it comes as no surprise that 
a civil war broke out. By the 1970s, the economy was still controlled by a small 
oligarchy, and the government was ruled by the military, which proved to have minimal 
regard for human rights.136 To maintain control in the densely populated country, the 
oligarchy and military established a pact. As Hugh Byrne describes it, “Between 1932 
and 1979 the core of the system rested on an alliance between the landowning class and 
the armed forces within which military leaders were guardians of the political order, 
defining the limits of political reform, while the landowning class oversaw the economic 
order and set tight limits on any change in this area.”137  With a global recession and a 
significant drop in coffee prices during the late 1970s, El Salvador’s economy was in 




                                                 
134 North, Bitter Grounds, 22. 
135 North, Bitter Grounds, 22. 
136 Corum and Johnson, Airpower in Small Wars, 327. 
137 Byrne, El Salvador’s Civil War, 23. 
138 A.J. Bacevich et al., American Military Policy in Small Wars:  The Case of El Salvador 
(Cambridge, MA:  Institute For Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., 1988), 3.   
 36
improve their living conditions. In fact, hundreds of thousands of peasants left El 
Salvador for neighboring Honduras to seek better opportunities to own land and secure a 
job.139   
According to Steffen W. Schmidt, El Salvador’s political system in the 1970s 
“had become a complex kaleidoscope reflecting various political factions, each promising 
the poor a utopia.”140  The political factions were mainly Marxist-Leninist groups. As it 
turns out, it was relatively easy for the communists to gain support in El Salvador. One 
reason was simply that the current government was not sufficiently responsive to the 
peasantry. Compared to the existing government structure and laws that primarily 
benefited the oligarchy, the communists offered the peasants a better life and more 
opportunities. In addition, the Catholic Church in El Salvador played a role in mobilizing 
the population to support the pro-communist political factions and the insurgency that 
followed.141 
Catholic priests and monks within El Salvador found themselves taking active 
positions advocating for the rights of the peasantry. The Catholic Archdiocese openly 
criticized the government and called for an end to repression and for a more progressive 
government. The Church eventually found itself in a dangerous predicament with its 
priests later targeted by government assassins. This culminated in the assassination of El 
Salvador’s Archbishop, Oscar Romero, on March 24, 1980.142   
Just before this, El Salvador’s communists received a huge boost in popularity 
thanks to the Sandinistas’ successful communist revolution in neighboring Nicaragua. El 
Salvador’s peasants thought that if the Nicaraguans could successfully overthrow a brutal 
and repressive government, they could do the same.143  On October 15, 1979, breakdown 
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within El Salvador’s political structure culminated in a military coup d’état and the 
military demanded that President Romero step down. 
The replacement government after the coup was known as the “progressive 
junta,” but unfortunately the new government was anything but progressive. 144  It proved 
incapable of addressing the peasants’ grievances, which only exacerbated the country’s 
underlying problems. Moreover, there was confusion and deep division within the 
Salvadoran military. Some military leaders wanted to address the issues and implement 
progressive reforms. Others did not want to implement reforms because they enjoyed too 
many benefits living under the old system. The coup ultimately led to a weakened 
military establishment and chaos ensued within the government.145  Dissatisfied with the 
“progressive junta,” civil war broke out in 1980 between the military-led government and 
various political factions.146 
As stated earlier, political factions in El Salvador were, for the most part, Marxist-
Leninist. By 1980, most joined a united front, the FMLN, which ultimately orchestrated 
the insurgency’s operations. There were other rebel factions involved in the insurgency, 
but they will not be addressed in this thesis as they played a minor role compared to the 
FMLN. 147   
Just as it had in the past when confronted by rebellion, the government responded 
to the FMLN and the insurrection initially with violence. It used targeted assassinations 
and sent out “death squads” to quell the rebellion. The results were tragic, and in 1980 
alone, the death squads committed more than 10,000 murders.148  The government’s 
brutality was widely publicized in the world arena. Disgusted with gross human rights 
violations, President Jimmy Carter decided to cut U.S. aid to El Salvador. Meanwhile, the 
use of death squads had an interesting effect in El Salvador itself. Instead of suppressing 
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the rebellion, their use resulted in an increase of popular support for the FMLN and the 
overall rebellion. By 1981, the FMLN fielded approximately 12,000 fighters and 
launched a “‘final offensive’” against the government, thanks to which it appeared as 
though the government was about to be overthrown and replaced with a communist 
government.149  Faced with the probability of another communist government emerging 
in Central America and afraid that El Salvador’s communist revolution would spill over 
to other Central and South American countries, President Carter decided to reinstate aid 
to El Salvador on his way out of office. 150 
The Reagan administration picked up where President Carter left off and decided 
to increase the U.S.’s commitment. Still suffering from the after-effects of Vietnam, the 
U.S. government did not want to commit U.S. combat troops and thereby Americanize 
the civil war in El Salvador. Eventually, the U.S. agreed to only send military advisors, 
equipment, financial aid, and intelligence support. American military advisors were 
specifically prohibited from participating in any combat operations. Ironically, the 
deployment of advisors to El Salvador was similar to how the U.S. initially involved 
itself in Vietnam. To avoid the potential political fallout of El Salvador “becoming 
another Vietnam,” the Reagan administration and Congress weighed the exact number of 
military advisors to send. They agreed on a maximum number of 55. Even so, Congress 
eventually allowed other U.S. military personnel to be assigned in El Salvador on a 
temporary duty basis.151  As a result, the U.S. Military Group (U.S. MilGroup) 
sometimes exceeded the 55-person limit. In 1984, for instance, there were 100 U.S. 
military personnel present in El Salvador, and in 1987 there were over 150 present.152  
Although the number of military advisors eventually exceeded the 55-person mandate, 
overall the U.S. military had an exceptionally small footprint in El Salvador.   
How much, meanwhile, did the U.S. invest in El Salvador?  During the course of 
El Salvador’s civil war, which lasted approximately twelve years, the U.S. provided 
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nearly $6 billion in total aid to El Salvador’s government. Of the $6 billion in total aid 
provided, the military received $1 billion. Annual military aid culminated in 1984 when 
El Salvador received $206 million. This $206 million in military aid seems substantial 
until one considers how small and not so strategic a country El Salvador is. However, 
when one analyzes the amount of aid Israel and Egypt received in 1984, $1.7 billion and 
$1.3 billion respectively, $206 million is certainly insubstantial.153  Taking into account 
the small amount of aid along with the exceptionally small U.S. military advisor footprint 
in El Salvador, one begins to wonder how the Salvadoran government was able to 
successfully counter the FMLN insurgency. 
In the fall of 1981, the U.S. sent Brigadier General Woerner and other military 
specialists to assess the situation in El Salvador. The result was the “Woerner report”154 
and the subsequent strategic plan that both the U.S. and El Salvador leadership agreed 
to.155  The strategic plan identified key priorities for El Salvador’s government to focus 
on in order to survive and successfully stamp out the rebellion. These included addressing 
“land reform, political reform in the form of honest elections, economic development, 
and the end of human rights abuses.”156  A key part of the strategic plan tied aid to 
whether or not El Salvador progressed in attaining these priorities, with special emphasis 
placed on ending human rights violations. If El Salvador’s government failed to make 
improvements, then the U.S. would cut off its aid and support. However, before the 
government could really focus on implementing social and political reforms, it needed to 
buy itself time in order to physically survive the FMLN’s onslaught. With El Salvador’s 
government on the brink of collapse in 1981, the U.S. and El Salvador concentrated on 
their military response. 
The military plan both countries agreed to focused on strengthening El Salvador’s 
ground component, which made sense given the nature of the conflict and threat. The 
FMLN was waging an insurgency. In its effort to overthrow the government by targeting 
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government institutions and forces, the FLMN sought to win over the majority of the 
population. Specifically, the U.S.-El Salvador military plan concentrated on increasing 
the size of El Salvador’s armed forces and their professionalization and training.   
In 1980, the El Salvadoran Armed Forces (ESAF) had approximately 10,000 
troops with minimal basic equipment (e.g., the ESAF did not have tactical radios in 1980) 
and 7,000 paramilitary police.157  By 1984, with the influx of U.S. aid, ESAF more than 
quadrupled in size to 42,000 troops and received modern military equipment. 158  As far 
as training was concerned, the U.S. Army sent its Special Forces, professionals in 
irregular warfare and counterinsurgency, to train and advise El Salvador’s ground forces 
on how to best fight and defeat the FMLN. Despite the U.S.’s focus on strengthening El 
Salvador’s ground forces to combat an irregular threat, the U.S. also supported El 
Salvador’s air force in the form of AvFID. 
In 1980, El Salvador’s air force, the Fuerza Aerea Salvadorena (FAS), was small 
with fewer than 1,000 personnel, four flying squadrons, and 67 aircraft. 159  The training 
level was subpar, especially at the enlisted level where “most enlisted men were simply 
conscripted (or “press-ganged”) young men, many of them in their midteens.” 160  
Compounding the problem, the FAS, as with the rest of the ESAF, was only trained in 
conventional warfare and had little understanding of counterinsurgency. The 
congressionally mandated 55-advisor limit also presented a challenge to the U.S. Air 
Force (USAF) advisors. The 55-mandate meant that only five personnel from the USAF 
were allowed to be in El Salvador at one time. The five-person USAF group was usually 
comprised of one section chief and four maintenance personnel or instructor pilots.161  
Given these small numbers, the USAF could not make El Salvador’s civil war the U.S.’s 
fight. 
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Of the $1 billion total U.S. aid given to El Salvador’s military, the FAS received 
approximately $250 million.162  By 1987, “the FAS had more than doubled in size since 
the start of the war”163 and its aircraft inventory included A-37s, UH-1H helicopters, O-2 
reconnaissance aircraft, C-123 transports, and AC-47 gunships. The strategic plan placed 
considerable emphasis on the FAS helicopter force. The helicopter was preferred over 
fixed-wing aircraft thanks to its ability to maneuver in El Salvador’s mountainous terrain, 
access remote areas, and provide gunship support to El Salvador’s army in contact with 
the FMLN.164  Specifically, the U.S. provided the FAS with “88 UH-1H Iroquois 
transports, 23 UH-1M gunships, and 14 Hughes 500 armed reconnaissance 
helicopters.”165  Because five advisors were insufficient to fully train the FAS, the U.S. 
provided pilot training to FAS airmen outside of El Salvador at Fort Rucker, Alabama 
and at the Inter-American Air Force Academy at Albrook Field in Panama.166 
Since the FMLN did not have airpower at its disposal and since the war was being 
fought on the ground, the FAS’s main task was to support El Salvador’s ground forces. 
FAS support came in the forms of transport, air resupply, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR), and close air support. At the start of the war, El Salvador’s Army 
and Air Force did not train for joint operations which are critical for most support 
missions, especially close air support (CAS). 167  In addition, the FAS had minimal 
ability to conduct night operations.168  As a result, the ESAF’s ability to neutralize the 
FMLN, who primarily operated at night, was severely hampered. In addition, the FAS’s 
mission capability rate (i.e., their ability to fly missions) was not very good and FAS 
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pilots did not fly as many missions as they could have given the amount of aircraft in 
their inventory. This was in large part due to a lack of qualified pilots and maintenance 
discipline within the ranks.169   
Despite these areas of ineffectiveness, the FAS did have some successes. Its most 
important accomplishment during this phase was that it provided enough support to the 
ground troops to effectively stop the FMLN’s offensive. Together, the FAS and El 
Salvador’s army ultimately prevented the collapse of El Salvador’s government. Thus, 
during the early years of the civil war, from 1981 to 1984, we can rate the performance of 
the newly U.S. trained and equipped FAS as fair.170 
When exactly the state of affairs started to turn around to favor El Salvador’s 
government is debatable. According to Colonel James J. Steele, commander of the U.S. 
MilGroup from 1984–1986, the situation started to change in 1984. Specifically, “the 
government forces were obviously getting better; the Air Force was particularly effective, 
and the guerrillas saw their prospects for a quick victory beginning to fade.”171  
Supporting Colonel Steele’s assessment, a former leader of the FMLN also took note of 
the increased effectiveness of the FAS. According to Miguel Castellanos, the improved 
air mobility of the El Salvadoran Army in 1984 “caused a very significant turn in the war, 
since they now acted deep inside enemy lines.”172  In addition, the FAS learned how to 
fly and fight at night. This new-found ability minimized the FMLN’s initiative, hampered 
the supply of weapons coming from Nicaragua and Cuba through Honduras, and severely 
threatened the FLMN’s overall ability to operate effectively.   
An important point to highlight here is that it took approximately four years of aid 
and training before significant progress in the military forces’ performance and 
effectiveness was discernible, especially in the air force. This prolonged period of time 
should not come as a surprise since military forces cannot be transformed overnight. 
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Transformation takes time, resources, dedication, and consistent quality training. The 
increase in effectiveness of the FAS that Colonel Steele and Miguel Castellanos observed 
can be attributed largely to both the increase in U.S. resources and the quality of training 
that the FAS received. The U.S.’s AvFID program in El Salvador can thus be judged to 
have certainly made a difference in El Salvador’s campaign against the FMLN. 
However, was the AvFID effort combined with the overall U.S. foreign internal 
defense effort in El Salvador adequate to fully neutralize the FMLN?  From 1985 to 
1989, the EFAS largely held the initiative. The FMLN was on the run and it appeared that 
the FMLN would soon be eliminated. But, the FMLN adapted to the new situation and 
adopted guerrilla warfare tactics which largely consisted of uncoordinated, hit and run 
tactics. By refusing to go away the FMLN frustrated the EFAS and the El Salvadoran 
government. By 1989, fighting was stalemated and remained so until peace was agreed to 
in 1992. Consequently, we could say that despite the U.S.’s foreign internal defense 
efforts and the efforts of the El Salvadoran government, the EFAS were not able to 
successfully eliminate the FMLN. 
A few contributing factors help explain why the EFAS was not able to 
successfully eliminate the FMLN. The army and the FAS continued to fight the war in a 
conventional manner and did not adapt their tactics to the FMLN’s new modus 
operandi.173  Whenever the FMLN massed and attacked, the ground forces and the FAS 
were successful in their counterattack. However, when the FMLN resorted to guerrilla 
tactics, the government forces were not as successful. Despite the advice received from 
the USAF advisors and U.S. Army Special Forces, the El Salvadorans decided to 
continue to fight by applying mass and firepower. However, as advisors had learned in 
Vietnam, mass and firepower do not have the same effect in a counterinsurgency 
campaign as they do in a conventional campaign. U.S. advisors in El Salvador were for 
the most part frustrated with the ESAF’s reluctance to transition to counterinsurgency 
operations. One American advisor who A.J. Bacevich interviewed “referred derisively to 
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ESAF’s ‘search and avoid patrols.’  Another likened the security of Salvadoran night 
positions to ‘a boy scout jamboree—campfires and transistor radios.’”174 
A second and arguably more important factor in the FMLN’s persistence was the 
government’s inability to address the underlying grievances of the population. An 
insurgency is a political war. Individuals drawn to insurgency usually have multiple 
problems with the reigning government. Barring genocide, and when neither side is able 
to fully eliminate the other, it logically follows that an insurgency will continue to exist 
until the problems are resolved or an agreement is reached between the insurgents and the 
government. To the government of El Salvador’s credit, it did achieve some progress, 
which came in the form of free elections and a reduction in human rights violations.175  
Despite the government’s efforts however, and even with the election of Jose Napoleon 
Duarte, who was viewed as a moderate, this progress was not enough. The population 
still distrusted the government and did not feel that political, economic, and social reform 
initiatives were working sufficiently well. Hence, support of the FMLN and violence 
continued. However, by 1990 events shifted for all players. 
At the end of 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. Discontinued Soviet financial and 
military support via Nicaragua and Cuba meant that the FMLN’s chances of survival 
significantly decreased. The Soviet collapse, coupled with a population exhausted after a 
three year stalemate and a horrific civil war that saw approximately 75,000 El Salvadoran 
die, led the FMLN and the government to negotiate a peace settlement in 1992. 176  An 
important aspect of this final settlement was that the FMLN was officially included in the 
El Salvadoran political process. A sign of how lasting the peace has been is that the 
President of El Salvador today represents the FMLN political party. 
Not surprisingly perhaps, the incorporation of the FMLN into El Salvador’s 
political process has not been without controversy. Some view the FMLN’s survival and 
inclusion in the El Salvadoran political process as a failure of El Salvador’s government, 
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the ESAF’s military strategy, U.S. policy, and U.S. foreign internal defense initiatives. 
This may be true to a certain extent, but the fact remains that the U.S. did achieve its 
ultimate goal of keeping El Salvador a democratic nation-state.177  In addition, El 
Salvador is arguably a stronger democracy with the inclusion of the FMLN, since it 
offers what the population fundamentally wanted – an entity within the government to 
represent them. Today, El Salvador is still a democracy and an ally of the U.S. El 
Salvador’s military is now a professional force and proved itself to be an important 
coalition member during Operation Iraqi Freedom.   
Without question, El Salvador could not have employed airpower as effectively it 
did without U.S. assistance. The U.S. supported the FAS through AvFID in the form of 
aircraft and equipment, financial aid, and training. This support proved to be a critical 
component in El Salvador’s counterinsurgency campaign. Overall, the role of airpower 
was not a decisive factor in the counterinsurgency campaign against the FMLN. 
However, airpower certainly played a critical role and without the training and advice 
from the U.S., the FAS would not have been able to conduct missions from the air as 
effectively as it did. Ultimately, AvFID made a significant difference in El Salvador’s 
civil war. 
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The role of airpower was not in and of itself the decisive factor in the Philippines’ 
and El Salvador’s successful COIN campaigns. However, airpower did play critical roles 
in both theaters, and without question it could not have done so without the U.S.’s AvFID 
efforts. In contrast, Vietnam exemplified how AvFID can be misapplied or implemented 
improperly. Worse, such a misuse can lead one to incorrectly conclude that AvFID does 
not make a difference. Thus, when looking at AvFID across a range of cases, one can say 
that when AvFID is implemented properly, it can make a difference. In addition, one can 
extrapolate quite a bit about how to implement AvFID properly in irregular warfare and 
COIN environments. 
First, arguably the most important factors to consider in a counterinsurgency 
campaign are the political, economic, and social factors. People are rebelling and killing 
their own for a reason. The reasons why they are rebelling and killing need to be 
understood and addressed. If the government in power does not adequately address the 
population’s grievances through reform, then the conduct of the insurgents will most 
likely continue.   
Second, an outsider or foreigner can gain an understanding of the rebellion 
through numerous methods, to include learning the country’s history and by interacting 
with the people who have grievances against the government. Edward Lansdale perfected 
this art. He never trusted government reports about what was going on during the Huk 
rebellion. Instead, he preferred to go out into the countryside to interact with the local 
population and to understand what was truly taking place at the local level. Occasionally, 
Lansdale even interacted with the insurgents themselves. It was through this type of 
interaction that Lansdale and Magsaysay were able to make informed decisions about 
which reforms to implement. Through reform, the goal of the government should be to 
gain legitimacy in the eyes of its citizenry. Furthermore, from the population’s 
perspective, the government must be worthier of its support than are the insurgents. 
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Third, relationships are critical. Much of Lansdale’s success in the Philippines can 
be attributed to his favorable relationship with Magsaysay. Similarly, it can be argued 
that Lansdale’s lack of success in Vietnam is partially attributable to his inability to 
become Diem’s primary advisor. Lansdale’s unsuccessful attempt to remove Diem’s 
brother, Nhu, as an influence provides an important lesson for future advisory efforts. If 
similar instances occur when the American advisor cannot become the primary advisor, 
then this could serve as a warning sign that the effort may prove futile. Furthermore, 
since the military effort should be subordinate to the political, social, and economic 
reform efforts of the government, it follows that the person in charge of the military 
COIN effort should either be someone who understands the target foreign government or 
someone who can successfully develop relationships with key foreign government 
officials who are in a position to implement the necessary reform measures. As alluded to 
earlier, the latter is preferable. 
Fourth, since the efforts of a COIN campaign should focus on government reform, 
it logically follows that most of the interactions to implement the reforms will take place 
at the interpersonal level. As such, the army or a police force will be the lead agencies, 
not the air force. Thus, airpower should be used in a supporting role and in lock-step 
coordination with the ground effort. This does not mean that airpower is insignificant or 
cannot make a difference. The Philippine and El Salvadoran case studies clearly show us 
how important it can be. 
Fifth, the military cannot fight the insurgency as if the conflict is a military 
problem. As mentioned earlier, the reasons for the insurgency are political, social, and 
economic. The military effort needs to be coordinated with, and in support of, the 
political, social, and economic reform efforts of the government. As the case studies 
reveal, these reform efforts should not focus on simply killing insurgents. This does not 
mean that armed insurgents, whose intent is to kill government forces, should not be 
killed. Rather, the government should focus more on removing support for the insurgency 
and avoid unintentionally creating additional insurgents.   
Probably the most effective method of creating additional insurgents is to kill 
innocent civilians. Unfortunately, airpower can easily kill innocent civilians, particularly 
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given the massive firepower at its disposal. Thus, it is crucial to use and train others to 
use airpower correctly in COIN. As explored in the Philippine and El Salvador case 
studies, the most effective COIN airpower missions were psychological, ISR, air 
resupply, and transport missions. CAS and air-to-ground interdiction missions were 
effective at times, but only when great efforts were taken to avoid civilian casualties. 
It is important to point out again that one of the most effective methods of 
airpower employed during the Huk rebellion was transporting Magsaysay to remote areas 
of the Philippines for his surprise inspections. These inspections were extremely 
important because they allowed Magsaysay, as Secretary of National Defense, to ensure 
his troops were behaving in a professional manner in Huklandia. Meanwhile, when 
Magsaysay arrived via air, his presence may have had an even bigger impact on the local 
population than on the military. The peasants actually saw an important member of the 
government visiting their farms and felt that Magsaysay cared about their general 
welfare. In return, Magsaysay received first-hand accounts about how the government 
was or was not living up to its responsibilities. He obtained many ideas for reforms from 
these trips with Lansdale. These proved crucial to earning the local population’s support 
for the Philippine government and, as the Philippine government earned the population’s 
support, the Huks lost the support they needed to continue their campaign against the 
government. It is with the simple employment of airpower such as in this example that 
AvFID can help produce the desired results in a COIN campaign.   
While airpower enthusiasts would not consider the mission sets described above 
or the position of being an aviation advisor to be strategic in the sense of using the USAF 
and its resources in the ways they would prefer, there is nonetheless an important 
strategic asset argument to make. AvFID is strategic in the sense that it enables the 
USAF to get involved in helping address threats in a target country before they rise to a 
crisis level. Of course, if these threats do rise to the international level, USAF advisors, 
along with Army advisors present, will be the immediate go-to personnel in that country. 
In addition, as previously mentioned, airpower enthusiasts prefer to fight in a way 
that allows them to capitalize on airpower, prep the battlefield for the ground forces to 
“mop-up” the remaining enemy forces and their war-making capacity, and minimize U.S. 
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casualties. When faced with budget cuts, like those the U.S. government is currently 
facing, USAF senior leaders have historically supported “strategic” airpower programs 
over not so strategic-seeming programs. Since AvFID is currently not considered the type 
of mission in which airpower can be employed strategically, the USAF is unlikely to 
want to continue to support it in fiscally difficult times. Whenever this happens, the 
overall USAF capability in irregular warfare suffers. Already this can be seen with what 
is currently happening to the 6th SOS, the sole USAF unit dedicated to AvFID. The 6th 
SOS recently retired its rotary wing (i.e., helicopter) capability and moved the squadron 
from the active duty wing at Hurlburt Field, Florida to Duke Field, Florida, home to a 
SOF reserve wing.   
As happened after Vietnam, with Iraq over, and with the near conclusion of 
Afghanistan, the USAF appears to be distancing itself once again from AvFID; the 
mission and capability is being transformed, absorbed or completely discarded. Yet, this 
is surely short-sighted since no one is suggesting that irregular warfare or insurgency in 
other countries is going away.   
One way to ensure that history does not repeat itself yet again is to mandate that 
the USAF establish an active duty unit dedicated solely to AvFID. Sometimes the only 
effective way to get a bureaucracy to act is through legislation. As legislation was needed 
to form USSOCOM, a similar piece of legislation now appears to be needed for AvFID.   
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine what a future AvFID 
organization should look like and where the mission should fit within AFSOC or the 
larger Air Force to ensure that it is not pushed aside. However, this thesis does point to a 
set of questions for further research. As previously mentioned, it is absolutely critical to 
have the air effort coordinated with the ground forces. Air Force Special Tactics (ST) 
Airmen are organized into squadrons in close proximity to the Army SOF units with 
which they operate. Thus, it initially appears to make sense to have AFSOC and Army 
FID units in close proximity, as they train and deploy together, so that the host nation 
receives a holistic training experience. Perhaps it similarly makes sense to locate AvFID 
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operational squadrons close to Army FID units. Research has already been undertaken 
that suggests this would be best for the NATO SOF Air Wing.178   
In addition, the ST community is small, yet growing and recently activated its 
own wing within AFSOC. Could lesson learned by the ST community be transferable to 
AvFID?  Likewise, Army SF units are organized into Groups, each of which is regionally 
aligned. Should AvFID units be similarly organized along geographical lines so that the 
advisors can become regional experts and, more importantly, develop and maintain the 
critical relationships needed within the target country? 
Sixth, when deployed, advisors should be tasked to perform a single mission set. 
In Vietnam, AvFID advisors were tasked to perform missions other than AvFID (i.e., 
covert paramilitary operations/unconventional warfare). Unfortunately, a unit can only do 
so much. If given multiple mission sets, the unit will invariably have to prioritize. In the 
case of Vietnam, the Farm Gate airmen preferred combat operations, including 
paramilitary covert operations, as opposed to training. However, this does not mean that 
an AvFID unit cannot perform combat or unconventional warfare missions. This point, 
rather, is to highlight the importance of not overtasking or creating confusion with what 
the unit’s mission is while in-theater. 
Seventh, AvFID is a long term investment and it takes time to see its return. In El 
Salvador, it took approximately four years of aid and training before significant progress 
in the military forces’ performance and effectiveness was discernible, especially in the air 
force. Progress in the Philippines took roughly the same amount of time. This prolonged 
period of time should not come as a surprise since military forces cannot be transformed 
overnight. Transformation takes time, resources, dedication, and consistent quality 
training. Thus, it is important for senior leaders to have this expectation going in. 
Eighth, it is possible that a correlation exits between limiting the number of 
advisors and the overall effectiveness of the advisory effort. In El Salvador, the advisor 
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limit was 55 and, in the Philippines, Landale’s team was even smaller. Needless to say, 
the overall military advisor footprint in Vietnam was massive. Also worth noting is that 
Americans were solely in an advisory position and did not participate in combat 
operations in either the Philippines or El Salvador. The combination of the small U.S. 
advisor footprint and not participating in combat operations prevented the U.S. from 
making the fight its own and reinforced the host nation’s ownership of the problem. In 
contrast, as soon as the U.S. received permission to participate in combat operations in 
Vietnam, the advisory mission slowly disappeared and the fight became the U.S.’s. 
Furthermore, due to the U.S.’s small footprint in the Philippines and El Salvador, the U.S. 
was able to assist in an inconspicuous manner. This prevented the U.S. from appearing to 
be an invading force or a country seeking to influence other countries’ affairs. Even 
better, it helped prevent the local government from appearing to be a U.S.-puppet 
government, which strengthened its legitimacy in the eyes of its population. In contrast, 
in Vietnam, the U.S. simply replaced the French as another imperialist power, which 
played directly into both the Viet Cong’s and North Vietnam’s narratives. Finally, the 
missions in the Philippines and El Salvador likely benefited from a lack of attention to 
these conflicts by the military establishment. The Huk rebellion coincided with the 
Korean War. Lansdale believed this was an important factor in his success since he had 
the leeway to do what he thought was best as Washington was distracted with Korea. A 
similar situation existed in El Salvador; the overall U.S. military establishment was not 
interested in that conflict. In contrast, in the case of Vietnam, the armed services were 
fighting each other for a bigger role in the conflict. 
Without additional research and a larger data set, it is hard to pinpoint exactly 
which factor had more of an impact among the following four, but it is likely a 
combination among them:  size of the U.S. footprint, ensuring the host nation fights its 
own fight, avoiding the appearance of the U.S. as an invading force, and less involvement 
by our military establishment. These factors have important implications for the 21st 
century U.S. military, especially when one considers the new DoD strategic vision. As 
the vision suggests, the U.S. would be wise to avoid massive military footprints and 
costly wars, which it did not do in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U.S. has other means by 
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which to accomplish its objectives, to include indirectly and through AvFID. Since 
AvFID made a difference in the past, it is reasonable to presume it can do so in the future. 
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